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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
PNC Bank, N.A. (“PNC”) challenges an order of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania certifying a nationwide litigation class of 
individuals who received residential mortgage loans from 
Community Bank of Northern Virginia (“CBNV”), a 
financial institution whose interests were later acquired by 
PNC.  The appeal presents several arguments against 
certification.  First, PNC contends that there is a fundamental 
class conflict that undermines the adequacy of representation 
provided by class counsel.  Second, PNC claims that the 
District Court conditionally certified the class and thus erred.  
Third, PNC says that the putative class does not meet the 
ascertainability, commonality, predominance, superiority, or 
manageability requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  We have considered each of those 
arguments and a number of subsidiary ones and find them 
unpersuasive.  We will therefore affirm.   
 
I.  Background 
 
This is the third appeal from the certification of a class 
based on allegations of an illegal home equity lending scheme 
involving two banks, specifically CBNV and Guaranty 
National Bank of Tallahassee (“Guaranty”), and also 
involving GMAC-Residential Funding Corporation n/k/a 
Residential Funding Corporation, LLC (“Residential 
Funding”), a company that purchased mortgage loans from 
those banks.  See In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. (Community 
Bank I), 418 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2005); In re Cmty. Bank of N. 
Va. (Community Bank II), 622 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
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two previous appeals involved certification of settlement 
classes, but this appeal involves certification of a litigation 
class.  Much of the factual and procedural history of this case 
is set out in detail in our two prior opinions, but we reiterate 
the relevant portions here.   
 
A. The Alleged Illegal Lending Scheme 
 
The Plaintiffs describe a predatory lending scheme 
affecting numerous borrowers nationwide and allegedly 
masterminded by the Shumway Organization (“Shumway”), a 
residential mortgage loan business operating in Chantilly, 
Virginia.  Through a variety of entities, including EquityPlus 
Financial, Inc. (“Equity Plus”), Equity Guaranty, LLC 
(“Equity Guaranty”), and various title companies, Shumway 
offered high-interest mortgage-backed loans to financially 
strapped homeowners.     
 
As a non-depository lender, Shumway was subject to 
fee caps and interest ceilings imposed by various state 
mortgage lending laws.  The Plaintiffs aver that, in an effort 
to circumvent those limitations, Shumway formed 
associations with several banks, including CBNV and 
Guaranty.  Shumway allegedly arranged payments to CBNV 
and Guaranty to disguise the source of its loan origination 
services so that fees for those services would appear to be 
paid solely to the banks, which were depository institutions.  
The Plaintiffs allege that, in reality, the overwhelming 
majority of fees and other charges associated with the loans 
were funneled through the two banks to Shumway via Equity 
Plus (in the case of loans made by CBNV) and Equity 
Guaranty (in the case of loans made by Guaranty).  After 
Virginia banking regulators expressed concern to CBNV 
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regarding the legality of the arrangement, the deal between 
CBNV and Equity Plus was allegedly restructured in October 
1998 so that Equity Plus became a “consultant” to CBNV that 
provided no settlement services yet still received the lion’s 
share of fees paid in exchange for those services.     
 
The Plaintiffs allege that CBNV and Guaranty 
uniformly misrepresented the apportionment and distribution 
of settlement and title fees on their HUD–1 Settlement 
Statement forms.1  The Plaintiffs further allege that the fees 
listed on the HUD–1s included illegal kickbacks to Shumway 
and did not reflect the value of any services actually 
performed.     
 
According to the Plaintiffs, Residential Funding 
derived a significant portion of its business from the 
securitization of “jumbo” mortgages2 and especially High-
Loan-to-Value loans.3  The Plaintiffs allege that Residential 
Funding purchased a majority and perhaps all of the loans 
                                              
1 A HUD–1 is a standard real estate settlement form 
that the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act requires in 
connection with all mortgage loans that are covered by 
federal law.  12 U.S.C. § 2603. 
2 A jumbo mortgage is a home loan with an amount 
that exceeds the conforming loan limits imposed by the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal 
National Mortgage Association, the two government-
sponsored enterprises that buy mortgages from lenders.   
3 Loans where the amount financed represent up to 
125% of the value of the securitized collateral are called 
High-Loan-to-Value loans.   
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originated by CBNV and Guaranty, despite knowing that 
those entities passed most of the origination and title service 
fees to Shumway.  Because Residential Funding derived 
substantial income from the settlement fees, the Plaintiffs 
allege that it ignored unlawful settlement practices and 
actively worked with CBNV and Guaranty to expand the loan 
volume generated by the scheme.    
 
In the early 2000s, a number of putative class actions 
arising out of the alleged Shumway scheme were filed by 
various plaintiffs (the “Original Plaintiffs”) and were 
eventually consolidated in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania.4  The Original Plaintiffs 
asserted claims arising under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (“RESPA”),5 the Racketeer Influenced and 
                                              
4 In all, six putative class actions were consolidated on 
July 18, 2003.  We provided a detailed outline of the separate 
class actions and the consolidation process in Community 
Bank I.  418 F.3d at 284-87.   
5 Congress enacted RESPA in 1974 in response to 
abusive loan practices that inflated the cost of real estate 
transactions.  12 U.S.C. § 2601(a).  Section 8 of RESPA 
prohibits kickbacks and unearned fees, and it may be 
enforced criminally or civilly.  Id. §§ 2607, 2614.  More 
specifically, section 8(b) of RESPA prohibits the giving or 
receiving of “any portion, split, or percentage of any charge 
made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement 
service … other than for services actually performed.”  Id. 
§ 2607(b).  Civil actions under that section must be brought 
within one year of the alleged violation.  Id. § 2614.   
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Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”),6 and Pennsylvania law.  
The putative class consisted of approximately 44,000 
borrowers.     
 
B. Community Bank I 
 
On July 14, 2003, the Original Plaintiffs and certain 
defendants, including CBNV, Guaranty, and Residential 
Funding, proposed a nationwide class action settlement, 
which was approved by the District Court.  Under the terms 
of the settlement, the maximum total payout to the 
approximately 44,000 member class was $33 million.  The 
settlement payouts ranged from $250 to $925 per borrower 
depending on the borrower’s residence and the date on which 
the loan was entered.  In exchange, the borrowers were to 
release any and all state or federal claims that they might have 
relating to the mortgage loans at issue, including the right to 
use a violation of federal or state law as a defense to any 
foreclosure action.  Because CBNV supported the settlement, 
                                              
6 RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed 
by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the 
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to 
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.”  18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  “Any person injured in his 
business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 
… may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district 
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and 
the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”  Id. 
§ 1964(c).   
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it did not contest the requirements for class certification.7  
The order approving the settlement was appealed by a group 
of plaintiffs (the “Objector Plaintiffs”) who argued that 
claims under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)8 and the 
                                              
7 Defendants may engage in settlement negotiations 
and become parties to a class action settlement agreement 
without giving up the ability to contest class certification 
requirements later should the settlement fall apart.  In re Gen. 
Motor Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 
F.3d 768, 786 (3d Cir. 1995).   
8 “TILA is a federal consumer protection statute[] 
intended to promote the informed use of credit by requiring 
certain uniform disclosures from creditors.”  Community 
Bank I, 418 F.3d at 303.  “Among other things, creditors who 
make loans secured by a borrower’s principal dwelling are 
required to provide all borrowers with ‘material disclosures,’ 
including ‘the annual percentage rate, the finance charge, the 
amount financed, the total payments, [and] the payment 
schedule.’”  Id. at 304 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.23) 
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted).  “If ‘material 
disclosures’ are not provided or inaccurately provided, the 
creditor is strictly liable and a borrower has the right to 
rescind the loan up to ‘3 years after consummation, upon 
transfer of all of the consumer’s interest in the property, [or] 
upon sale of the property, whichever occurs first.’”  Id. 
(quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.23) (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted).  “In addition to the right of rescission, an aggrieved 
borrower may, within one year of the date of the violation, 
seek ‘actual damage[s] sustained … as a result of the failure,’ 
and statutory damages, which cannot exceed $500,000 or one 
percent of the creditor’s net worth (whichever is less) in the 
case of a class action.”  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
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Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (“HOEPA”)9 
should also have been asserted on behalf of the putative class.     
 
                                                                                                     
§ 1640(a)(1),(2)(B)) (alteration in original) (footnote 
omitted).   
9 “HOEPA, enacted as an amendment to TILA, creates 
a special class of regulated loans that are made at higher 
interest rates or with excessive costs and fees” than those 
regularly covered by TILA.  Community Bank I, 418 F.3d at 
304.  HOEPA protections apply if a loan meets one of two 
high-cost loan triggers: (1) the annual percentage rate 
(“APR”) exceeds by more than 6.5 percent or 8.5 percent, 
depending on the value of the transaction, the yield on 
Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity for 
first-lien loans, or above ten percent for subordinate-lien 
loans; or (2) the total of all the loan’s points and fees exceed 
eight percent of the loan total or $400 (adjusted for inflation), 
whichever is greater.  15 U.S.C. § 1602(bb)(1) & (3); 12 
C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i), (ii).   
Loans covered by HOEPA are not only subject to 
certain restrictions, but are also subject to special disclosure 
requirements.  15 U.S.C. § 1639.  Within three business days 
prior to the consummation of a loan, a creditor is required to 
disclose to the borrower, inter alia, the APR of the loan and 
the amount of regular monthly payments.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1639(a)(2) & (b)(1).  Failure to materially comply with such 
requirements entitles a borrower to “an amount equal to the 
sum of all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer.”  
Id. § 1640(a)(4).  An action for damages under HOEPA must 
be brought within one year of the violation, id. § 1640(e), and 
an action for rescission must be brought within three years, 12 
C.F.R. § 226.23.  Community Bank II, 622 F.3d at 283.   
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We vacated the order approving the settlement and 
remanded the case because, among other things, the District 
Court had not adequately analyzed the propriety of class 
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.  
Community Bank I, 418 F.3d at 300-02.  We stated that 
various class certification requirements, which had not been 
disputed, were likely met, id. at 303 (suggesting “that the 
numerosity, typicality, and commonality prongs are met”), 
but we specifically directed the District Court to perform its 
own independent analysis, id. at 306 (“All of the above, of 
course, are issues to be considered by the District Court in its 
independent analysis.”).  In particular, we questioned whether 
the putative class representatives – whose claims were 
untimely under TILA/HOEPA without the benefit of 
equitable tolling – could adequately represent putative class 
members who had timely TILA/HOEPA claims.  Id. at 306-
07.  To resolve that problem with the adequacy of 
representation, we suggested that the District Court “divid[e] 
the class into sub-classes.”  Id. at 307.   
 
C. Community Bank II 
 
On remand, the District Court approached its analysis 
in two steps.  First, it addressed the viability of potential 
TILA/HOEPA claims.  Second, it addressed adequacy of 
representation and other Rule 23 requirements.  While the 
parties were briefing the viability issue, the Original Plaintiffs 
entered into new settlement negotiations with the defendants, 
which resulted in a new settlement agreement (the “Modified 
Settlement Agreement”).  The Modified Settlement 
Agreement took the availability of TILA/HOEPA claims into 
account and increased the settlement amount for class 
members who were able to assert such claims.     
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The District Court then heard oral argument on the 
viability of potential TILA/HOEPA claims.  In discussing the 
case, the Original Plaintiffs and the Objector Plaintiffs agreed 
with the District Court that a Rule 12(b)(6) standard should 
be used to determine the viability of potential TILA/HOEPA 
claims.  The District Court’s reasoning appeared to be that, if 
those claims could not survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss (and thus were not viable), neither the named 
plaintiffs nor their counsel could be faulted – on adequacy of 
representation grounds or otherwise – for failing to bring 
them.  In October 2006, the District Court issued an order in 
which, purportedly applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard,10 it 
determined that the potential TILA/HOEPA claims were not 
viable.  It concluded that “no class member could bring a 
timely claim under TILA or HOEPA for damages or 
rescission” because those claims would not relate back to any 
earlier complaint, and it also concluded that “no class 
member could rely on equitable tolling to save their otherwise 
time-barred claims.”  Community Bank II, 622 F.3d at 288.   
                                              
10 “Though the District Court purported to approach 
this question using a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, its analysis 
actually dealt with Rule 15(c), which governs the 
circumstances where an amended pleading ‘relates back to 
the date of the original pleading.’”  Community Bank II, 622 
F.3d at 295 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)).  “The Court 
approached the relation-back question – i.e., whether an 
amended pleading asserting TILA/HOEPA claims could 
relate back to any earlier complaint – not by reference to a 
hypothetical amended complaint that the existing named 
plaintiffs could file, but by reference to an amended 
complaint filed by absent members of the class.”  Id.   
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On December 1, 2006, the District Court informed the 
parties that it intended to appoint an “independent body” to 
evaluate the fairness of the Modified Settlement Agreement.  
Id.  The Court later appointed Donald Ziegler, a retired Chief 
Judge of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, to provide a non-binding opinion as 
to whether the Modified Settlement Agreement was “fair and 
reasonable” under Rule 23.  Id.  Judge Ziegler heard 
arguments from the parties and issued an advisory opinion in 
which he concluded that the Modified Settlement Agreement 
was fair and reasonable.  On August 14, 2008, the District 
Court issued an order adopting Judge Ziegler’s 
recommendation.  The Court certified the settlement class and 
approved the Modified Settlement Agreement.     
 
The Objector Plaintiffs once more appealed, 
challenging both the District Court’s certification order and 
its earlier ruling regarding the adequacy of representation.  
We again vacated the District Court’s order, finding that the 
Court had erred in a number of ways.  Without actually 
deciding the issue, we expressed doubts about the District 
Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) analysis because, in our opinion, the 
Objector Plaintiffs had a “strong argument that their 
TILA/HOEPA claims” qualified for class action tolling.  Id. 
at 300.  We also stated that, “because the question [of] 
whether a particular party is eligible for equitable tolling 
generally requires consideration of evidence beyond the 
pleadings, such tolling is generally not amenable to resolution 
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”  Id. at 301-02.  We went on to 
note that, in any event, the District Court’s merits inquiries – 
i.e., whether a new plaintiff could file an amended pleading 
asserting TILA/HOEPA claims or adequately plead a basis 
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for equitable tolling under Rule 12(b)(6) – “were unnecessary 
to evaluate the adequacy requirement.”  Id. at 303.   
 
Looking at the adequacy requirement, we concluded, 
that the District Court had “incorrectly evaluated the 
adequacy of the named plaintiffs and class counsel.”  Id.  We 
repeated that the adequacy requirement is designed “‘to 
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the 
class they seek to represent.’”  Id. (quoting Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997)).  And we stated 
that there was an “obvious and fundamental intra-class 
conflict of interest,” which was the same conflict of interest 
we had identified in Community Bank I.  Community Bank II, 
622 F.3d at 303.  We were concerned that the class 
representatives’ RESPA and TILA/HOEPA claims were 
untimely and required equitable tolling to be saved, but that 
they nevertheless sought to represent a “sizeable subgroup” of 
approximately 14,000 persons who had timely claims under 
each statute.  Id.  We directed the District Court to consider 
that intra-class conflict on remand and stated that “[t]he most 
obvious remedy would be to create subclasses.”  Id. at 304.   
 
We also noted that, as to class counsel, the adequacy 
requirement assures that counsel possesses adequate 
experience, will vigorously prosecute the action, and will act 
at arm’s length from the defendant.  Id. at 304-05.  “[M]ere 
disagreement,” we said, “over litigation strategy … does not 
in and of itself, establish inadequacy of representation.”  Id. at 
305 (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).  
“Were it otherwise, disagreements over strategy would 
require decertification any time an objection is raised to a 
class, certainly not the standard envisioned by Rule 23.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Looking to the particulars 
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presented in Community Bank II, we stated that, while “class 
counsel is not inadequate simply because they have not 
asserted every claim that could theoretically be pled against a 
defendant,” class counsel’s explanation for not asserting 
TILA/HOEPA claims on behalf of the class “deserve[d] more 
scrutiny” than the Court had given it.  Id. at 305.  
Accordingly, we directed the District Court to examine the 
adequacy of class counsel more closely on remand.  Id. at 
314.   
 
D. Post-Community Bank II Proceedings11 
 
Following remand, the Original Plaintiffs abandoned 
settlement negotiations and joined forces with the Objector 
Plaintiffs, and on October 4, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a Joint 
Consolidated Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) that 
now includes TILA/HOEPA claims, along with RESPA and 
RICO claims.  The Complaint originally named as 
Defendants CBNV, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) as the Receiver for Guaranty,12 PNC 
                                              
11 On April 24, 2013, the judge who had presided in 
this case passed away.  United States District Judge Arthur 
Schwab has presided over the case since May 16, 2013. 
12 On March 12, 2004, after this litigation began, the 
Comptroller of the Currency declared Guaranty to be unsafe 
and unsound, and appointed the FDIC as receiver.  On 
March 29, 2004, the FDIC asked to be substituted for 
Guaranty as the true party in interest.  That motion was 
granted.     
 18 
 
Bank as Successor to CBNV,13 and Residential Funding.  
Residential Funding subsequently filed a Notice of 
Bankruptcy and Effect of Automatic Stay, and all claims 
against it were stayed.  The District Court also granted the 
FDIC’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.14  As a result, the only active claims remaining 
before the District Court at the certification stage were those 
asserted against CBNV and its successor in interest, PNC.     
 
On June 21, 2013, the Plaintiffs moved for 
certification of a general class and of five subclasses.  The 
general class was defined as: “All persons nationwide who 
obtained a second or subordinate, residential, federally 
related, non purchase money, mortgage loan from CBNV that 
was secured by residential real property used by the Class 
Members as their principal dwelling, for the period May 
1998-December 2002.”  (App. at 1271.)  The five subclasses 
were defined as: 
 
Sub-Class 1: (RESPA [Affiliated Business 
Association] Disclosure Sub-Class) (Plaintiffs: 
Philip and Jeannie Kossler) – All persons 
nationwide who obtained a second or 
                                              
13 Mercantile Bankshares Corp. acquired CBNV in 
2005.  PNC acquired Mercantile Bankshares Corp. in 2007.   
14 The FDIC moved for dismissal pursuant to, among 
other legal authorities laid out in a 60-page brief, Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(b)(7).  
The June 12, 2013 order dismissing the claims against the 
FDIC appears to grant the motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 
but the Court provided no explanation for its ruling.     
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subordinate, residential, federally related, non 
purchase money, mortgage loan from CBNV 
that was secured by residential real property 
used by the Class Members as their principal 
dwelling for the period May 1998-October 
1998; 
Sub-Class 2: (RESPA Kickback Sub-Class) 
(Plaintiffs: Brian and Carla Kessler; John and 
Rebecca Picard) – All persons nationwide who 
obtained a second or subordinate, residential, 
federally related, non purchase money, 
mortgage loan from CBNV that was secured by 
residential real property used by the Class 
Members as their principal dwelling for the 
period October 1998-November 1999; 
Sub-Class 3: (TILA/HOEPA Non-Equitable 
Tolling Sub-Class) (Plaintiffs: Kathy and John 
Nixon; Flora Gaskin; and, Tammy and David 
Wasem) – All persons nationwide who obtained 
a second or subordinate, residential, federally 
related, non purchase money, mortgage loan 
from CBNV that was secured by residential real 
property used by the Class Members as their 
principal dwelling for the period May 1, 2001-
May 1, 2002; 
Sub-Class 4: (TILA/HOEPA Equitable Tolling 
Sub-Class) (Plaintiffs: All [named] plaintiffs 
other than the Nixons, Gaskins and Wasems) – 
All persons nationwide who obtained a second 
or subordinate, residential, federally related, 
non purchase money, mortgage loan from 
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CBNV that was secured by residential real 
property used by the Class Members as their 
principal dwelling for the period May 1998-
December 2002; 
Sub-Class 5: (RICO Sub-Class) (Plaintiffs: John 
and Rebecca Picard; Brian and Carla Kessler) – 
All persons nationwide who obtained a second 
or subordinate, residential, federally related, 
non purchase money, mortgage loan from 
CBNV that was secured by residential real 
property used by the Class Members as their 
principal dwelling for the period May 1998-
November 1999.   
(App. at 1271-1272.)  The Plaintiffs requested that all named 
class representatives be appointed as representatives of the 
general class and that the designated class representatives be 
appointed as representatives of the requested subclasses.  The 
Plaintiffs also requested that two law firms be appointed as 
co-lead counsel and that a handful of other lawyers and law 
firms be appointed as class counsel.     
 
On July 31, 2013, the District Court granted class 
certification.15  The Court’s certification ruling relied heavily 
on our dicta in Community Bank I discussing the requirements 
of Rule 23, and it approved the general class and subclasses 
proposed by the Plaintiffs.  The order did not make provision 
for separate counsel for the subclasses.  In analyzing the 
                                              
15 As noted by the District Court, the Motion for 
Certification was silent as to any state law claims.  As a 
result, no state law claims were certified for class treatment.   
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adequacy requirement, the District Court relied primarily on 
Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 F.3d 170 (3d 
Cir. 2012), in which we stated that only “fundamental” intra-
class conflicts will defeat the adequacy requirement.  Id. at 
183-84.  Because the Original Plaintiffs and the Objector 
Plaintiffs each asserted TILA/HOEPA claims in the 
Complaint, the District Court concluded that there is no 
fundamental conflict between the subclasses.  PNC has now 
appealed the class certification order.16   
 
II. Discussion17  
 
The fundamental question in this appeal is whether the 
litigation class, including its subclasses, was properly 
certified.  To be certified, a class must satisfy the four 
requirements of Rule 23(a), namely: (1) numerosity; (2) 
commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of 
representation.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  The parties seeking 
class certification bear the burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the requirements of Rule 
                                              
16 PNC petitioned for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 
23(f).  That petition was granted on October 12, 2013 by a 
panel of this court.     
17 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) 
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).  We review a class 
certification order for abuse of discretion, which occurs if the 
district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding 
of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper 
application of law to fact.  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008).   
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23(a) have been met.  Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 
306 (3d Cir. 2013).  To carry that burden, they must 
“affirmatively demonstrate” that “there are in fact sufficiently 
numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.”  
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) 
(emphasis in original).   
 
If the Rule 23(a) requirements are met, then a court 
must consider whether the class fits within one of the three 
categories of class actions set forth in Rule 23(b).  In the 
present case, the Plaintiffs have chosen to pursue their claims 
under Rule 23(b)(3), the customary vehicle for obtaining 
damages.  That Rule requires a court to consider whether 
common questions of law or fact predominate and whether 
the class action mechanism is the superior method for 
adjudicating the case.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  The 
manageability of class litigation is pertinent to those findings.  
Id.  We have also recognized that “an essential prerequisite of 
a class action, at least with respect to actions under Rule 
23(b)(3), is that the class must be currently and readily 
ascertainable based on objective criteria.”  Carerra, 727 F.3d 
at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
As noted at the outset, PNC advances three principal 
arguments against certification, contending first that there is a 
class conflict that undermines the adequacy of representation 
provided by class counsel; second, that the District Court 
erred by conditionally certifying the class; and, third, that the 
putative class does not satisfy the demands of Rule 23, 
particularly the requirements of ascertainability, 
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commonality, predominance, superiority, or manageability.  
We consider each argument in turn.18   
 
A. Adequacy of Representation 
 
The adequacy requirement primarily examines two 
matters: the interests and incentives of the class 
                                              
18 PNC also argues that the District Court erred in the 
following ways: (1) failing to accord ample time for 
discovery before deciding whether to certify the putative 
class; (2) limiting class certification briefs to 20 pages; (3) 
compressing the class certification briefing schedule; (4) 
limiting counsel’s arguments at the class certification hearing; 
and (5) relying too heavily on dicta from Community Bank I 
and thereby failing to perform an independent analysis of the 
certification requirements.  Those arguments are 
unpersuasive.  As to the first argument, the Plaintiffs respond 
that, prior to certification, “the parties conducted discovery 
and exchanged thousands of pages of documents which bore 
on the propriety of class certification.”  (Answering Br. at 
13.)  PNC’s only reply appears to be that it would have liked 
even more discovery, since it apparently failed to engage in 
rigorous discovery while it waited for the District Court to 
rule on its motion to dismiss.  That is not an adequate 
response, particularly given that the District Court denied a 
motion to stay discovery in November 10, 2011, and did not 
rule on PNC’s motion to dismiss until June 12, 2013.  As to 
the second, third, and fourth arguments, PNC provides no 
legal authority to suggest that any of the alleged defects are 
grounds for reversal.  As to the fifth argument, the District 
Court adequately addressed each certification requirement in 
its memorandum opinion, as is more fully discussed herein.   
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representatives, and the experience and performance of class 
counsel.  Community Bank I, 418 F.3d at 303.  PNC does not 
question the adequacy of the class representatives.  The 
argument it raises is directed instead at class counsel.  In 
particular, it asserts that “the ‘fundamental’ intra-class 
conflict found by this Court continues to exist because the 
District Court failed to appoint separate counsel to represent 
the subclasses it created.”19  (Reply Br. at 1.)     
 
According to PNC, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), requires that 
separate counsel be appointed for each subclass.  In Ortiz, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
 
[I]t is obvious after Amchem [Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)] that a class 
divided between holders of present and future 
claims (some of the latter involving no physical 
injury and attributable to claimants not yet 
born) requires division into homogeneous 
subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), with 
separate representation to eliminate conflicting 
interests of counsel.  See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
627, … (class settlements must provide 
“structural assurance of fair and adequate 
representation for the diverse groups and 
individuals affected”). 
                                              
19 Although they do not cite the rule, we understand 
PNC to be challenging counsel’s ability to fairly and 
adequately represent the interests of the class under Rule 
23(g)(1)(B).   
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527 U.S. at 856.  But PNC provides precious little support for 
its assertion that the situation in Ortiz is present here and that 
class counsel is conflicted or somehow otherwise inadequate.  
The passing argument PNC does present fails to persuade us 
that, in light of Ortiz and the case it relies on, Amchem, the 
District Court abused its discretion when it chose not to 
appoint separate counsel for each subclass.  In fact, an 
argument like PNC’s was specifically rejected by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Professional 
Firefighters Association of Omaha, Local 385 v. Zalewski, 
678 F.3d 640, 646-47 (8th Cir. 2012).  As the court in that 
case explained:   
 
Ortiz and Amchem were massive tort class 
actions prompted by the elephantine mass of 
asbestos cases that defied customary judicial 
administration.  The Supreme Court found the 
exceedingly divergent interests of present and 
future claim holders in those cases required 
separate counsel to address adequately the 
conflict.  But the need for separate 
representation under the atypical circumstances 
of Ortiz and Amchem does not make appointing 
separate counsel the only acceptable means of 
addressing any conflicting interests of class 
members, and providing structural assurance of 
fair and adequate representation for the entire 
class.   
678 F.3d at 646 (brackets, citations, and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In other words, the circumstances that 
required separate counsel in Ortiz simply were not present in 
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Professional Firefighters, nor do we think they are present 
here.   
 
The principal purpose of the adequacy requirement is 
to determine whether the named plaintiffs have the ability and 
the incentive to vigorously represent the claims of the class.  
Community Bank II, 622 F.3d at 291.  We have explained that 
“the linchpin of the adequacy requirement is the alignment of 
interests and incentives between the representative plaintiffs 
and the rest of the class.”  Dewey, 681 F.3d at 183.  More 
important for our purposes, however, is the corollary 
principle that class counsel may not, consistent with Ortiz, 
represent an entire class if subgroups within the class have 
interests that are significantly antagonistic to one another.  
We must therefore ascertain the alignment of interests within 
the class and whether conflicts, if any, are serious enough to 
require separate counsel for each subclass.   
 
Not every intra-class conflict is consequential, but 
certain ones are what we have called “fundamental.”  Dewey, 
681 F.3d at 184.  A “fundamental” conflict exists, for 
example, when some class members “have been harmed by 
the same conduct that benefitted other members of the class.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  To be “fundamental,” 
a conflict must touch on “‘the specific issues in 
controversy.’”  Id. (quoting Alba Conte & Herbert B. 
Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 3:26 (4th ed. 2002)).  
While it may be wise to appoint separate counsel even before 
a serious conflict fully emerges, the requirement to put 
separate counsel in place arises when a conflict ceases to be 
theoretical and becomes real and fundamental.   
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In Community Bank II, we stated that there was “an 
obvious and fundamental intra-class conflict of interest” that 
precluded a finding of adequacy of representation.  622 F.3d 
at 303.  Elaborating, we explained that the conflict of interest 
stemmed from the fact that the named class representatives 
had untimely claims under RESPA, TILA, or HOEPA that 
would require equitable tolling to survive and yet they sought 
to represent at the settlement negotiating table a sizeable 
subgroup of class members who had timely claims.  Id.  We 
said that the “most obvious remedy” for this conflict “would 
be to create subclasses.”  Id. at 304.  On remand, the District 
Court considered the Plaintiffs’ proposed five subclasses, 
which had been formed “to ameliorate the statute of 
limitations problems” that we identified in Community Bank I 
and Community Bank II.  (App. at 18.)  The Court noted that 
CBNV’s conduct “was the same as to all class members” and 
characterized the distinction between the subclasses as merely 
“a temporal one, that is, when [actionable] conduct occurred.”  
(Id.)  In short, the Court effectively concluded that there was 
not a fundamental conflict any longer, now that subclasses 
had been formed and the putative class was to be certified for 
litigation rather than settling for a fixed amount.   
 
Unfortunately, PNC spends practically no effort in this 
appeal trying to demonstrate that any intra-class conflict 
should now be viewed as “fundamental,” even though that 
issue is essential to its leading argument.  It relies on 
Community Bank II’s statement that a fundamental class 
conflict existed, which defeated certification of the settlement 
class.  PNC accuses the District Court and the Plaintiffs of 
disregarding, “in the starkest manner possible, an explicit 
command of [the Third Circuit].”  (Opening Br. at 18.)  But 
PNC fails to address the basic change in circumstances that 
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has occurred since Community Bank II: we are no longer 
dealing with a settlement class and a fixed sum to satisfy 
claims.  The Original Plaintiffs and the Objector Plaintiffs 
have jointly filed a new Complaint that asserts RESPA, 
TILA/HOEPA, and RICO claims on behalf of all subclasses.  
Those new circumstances are materially different from the 
scenarios presented in Community Bank I, Community Bank 
II, or the other cases cited by PNC, in which subclasses were 
jockeying for pieces of a limited settlement pie.  By contrast, 
the subclasses here are not competing for limited settlement 
funds.  All class members can assert all of their available 
claims, and all class members can, at least in theory, recover 
all of their damages without impacting the recovery of any 
other class members.   
 
PNC has provided no reason to believe that, in this 
new context, the named class representatives of each subclass 
will not vigorously represent the interests of their fellow class 
members.  They are all pursuing damages under the same 
statutes and the same theories of liability, and the differences 
among them will not, at least as things presently stand, pit one 
group’s interests against another.  Cf. In re Corrugated 
Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 208 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(“[S]o long as all class members are united in asserting a 
common right, such as achieving the maximum possible 
recovery for the class, the class interests are not antagonistic 
for representation purposes.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  There is thus no fundamental intra-class conflict to 
prevent class certification, Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 
F.3d 948, 960 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating parenthetically that the 
adequacy requirement consists of an “absence of antagonism” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)), nor is there any 
derivative conflict of interest that would prevent counsel from 
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fairly and adequately representing the interests of the entire 
class.   
 
In summary, the conflict that existed when a settlement 
class was facing a fixed pool of resources to resolve all claims 
is, for the time being, no longer a problem that can rightly be 
called fundamental.  Appointing separate counsel, therefore, 
was not a necessary prerequisite for certification of the 
subclasses.   
 
We would be remiss, however, if we did not note a 
problem growing on the horizon, and it is a familiar one by 
now in this case.  If the District Court determines that any 
subclass’s equitable tolling arguments fail, it may well be 
necessary to appoint separate counsel to represent newly 
divergent interests.  Whether to make any adjustments now, 
rather than later, is for the District Court to consider when 
and as it sees fit.  The conflict is only a potential one now and 
not yet imminent.  On this record, we cannot say that the 
District Court abused its discretion in deciding that the 
adequacy requirement has been satisfied, notwithstanding the 
joint representation of the subclasses.  Cf. Gunnells v. 
Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 430 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“To defeat the adequacy requirement … a conflict must be 
more than merely speculative or hypothetical.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litig., MDL No. 1663, 2007 WL 2589950, at *11 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 4, 2007), aff’d, 579 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] 
conflict will not be sufficient to defeat class action unless that 
conflict is apparent, imminent, and on an issue at the very 
heart of the suit.” (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted)); Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg On 
Class Actions § 3:58 (5th ed. 2011) (“A conflict must be 
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manifest at the time of certification rather than dependent on 
some future event or turn in the litigation that might never 
occur.”); id. § 9:48 (4th ed. 2002) (“When the divergent 
interests will arise only [later] …, generally the use of 
subclasses may be deferred until such time as the potential 
conflicts arise in fact.”).   
 
B. Conditional Certification 
 
Following certification, the District Court agreed to 
give the Plaintiffs an opportunity to conduct further discovery 
touching on merits-related issues.  PNC argues that, in doing 
so, the District Court conditionally certified the class – an 
approach that PNC asserts is “entirely backwards” and 
represents a prohibited practice.  (Opening Br. at 29.)  See 
Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 358 (3d Cir. 
2013) (“Certification may not be granted because the plaintiff 
promises the class will be able to fulfill Rule 23’s 
requirements, with the caveat that the class can always be 
decertified if it later proves wanting.  To certify a class in this 
manner is effectively to certify the class conditionally, which 
Rule 23 does not permit.”); see also In re Nat’l Football 
League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 579 
(3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that the Supreme Court and 
Congress specifically amended Rule 23 to preclude 
conditional certification of putative class actions).   
 
PNC relies upon statements made by the Court at a 
status conference held on August 28, 2013, a month after it 
had certified the class, to argue that the class was 
conditionally certified.  For instance, at one point the Court 
stated, “I want to know what documents you’re looking for 
that will prove your theory not only of the case, but be 
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supportive of the fact that this should be a class action 
proceeding as opposed to individual cases.”  (App. at 1824.)  
After reviewing the transcript of the entire status conference, 
however, we conclude that the District Court did not 
impermissibly certify the class on a conditional basis.  At that 
conference, the Court attempted to streamline proceedings 
going forward, including additional discovery that the 
Plaintiffs had requested.  To that end, the Court discussed the 
nature and quality of evidence the Plaintiffs were seeking.  
Although it articulated an expectation that discovery would 
vindicate its decision to grant class certification, we do not 
believe that the Court’s statements were meant to indicate that 
the earlier ruling was conditional.  PNC points to nothing in 
the ruling itself to show that it was an impermissible 
conditional certification.  We conclude, therefore, that the 
class was not conditionally certified.   
 
C. Other Rule 23 Requirements 
 
1. Ascertainability 
 
“[A]n essential prerequisite of a class action, at least 
with respect to actions under Rule 23(b)(3), is that the class 
must be currently and readily ascertainable based on objective 
criteria.”  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am. LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-
93 (3d Cir. 2012).  “If class members are impossible to 
identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or 
‘mini-trials,’ then a class action is inappropriate,” id. at 593, 
because, “[i]f a class cannot be ascertained in an economical 
and administratively feasible manner, significant benefits of a 
class action are lost,” Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  It is the Plaintiffs’ burden 
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the class is 
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currently and readily ascertainable.  Id. at 306.  “‘A party’s 
assurance to the court that it intends or plans to meet the 
requirements [of Rule 23] is insufficient.’”  Id. (quoting In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d 
Cir. 2008)) (brackets in original).  “A plaintiff may not 
merely propose a method of ascertaining a class without any 
evidentiary support that the method will be successful.”  Id. at 
306.  “A critical need of the trial court at certification is to 
determine how the case will be tried, including how the class 
is to be ascertained.”  Id. at 307 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
PNC asserts that some borrowers may have declared 
bankruptcy since entering into mortgage loans with CBNV 
and therefore a bankruptcy estate rather than the borrower 
may now be the real party in interest.  As PNC sees it, that 
puts at issue the standing of each putative class member and 
renders ascertainment of the class impossible without 
substantial individualized inquiry.  To determine the standing 
of each putative class member, PNC claims it would be 
necessary to determine each of the following facts: (1) 
whether the putative class member filed for bankruptcy; (2) if 
so, whether the putative class member disclosed the claims in 
the bankruptcy proceeding that it now seeks to assert in the 
class action; and (3) if no such disclosure was made, whether 
the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claims such that they 
may be pursued here.     
 
That argument is mired in speculation, and Carrera, 
the case upon which PNC primarily relies, provides no 
support.  In Carrera, the plaintiff sought to certify a 
nationwide class to sue Bayer Corporation and Bayer 
Healthcare (collectively “Bayer”) for false and deceptive 
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advertising practices in connection with a product called 
“One-A-Day WeightSmart.”  Id. at 304.  Bayer did not sell 
the weight-loss pills directly to consumers.  Id.  Instead, the 
pills were sold in retail stores, which meant that Bayer had no 
list of purchasers.  Id.  Acknowledging that class members 
were unlikely to have documentary proof of purchase, the 
plaintiff proposed two ways to ascertain the class: scour 
retailer records of online sales or solicit affidavits from 
prospective class members attesting that they purchased One-
A-Day WeightSmart.  Id.  On those facts, we determined that 
the plaintiff had not met his burden of showing that the class 
was ascertainable because he failed to adduce sufficient 
evidence showing that the first method could identify even a 
single purchaser of One-A-Day-WeightSmart and because the 
second method would result in too much individualized 
inquiry.  Id. at 308-12.  The case before us now does not 
appear to present the evidentiary problems at issue in 
Carerra.  On the contrary, PNC possesses all of the relevant 
bank records needed to identify the putative class members.   
 
PNC’s ruminations about bankruptcy are not 
persuasive.  First, we have held that only named plaintiffs, 
and not unnamed class members, need to establish standing.  
In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent 
Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 306-07 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 
Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1215 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“In a class action, standing is satisfied if at least 
one named plaintiff meets the requirements.”).  Second, 
unlike in Carrera and other cases in which putative class 
members were not ascertainable, the Plaintiffs here have 
identified a reliable, repeatable process whereby members of 
the putative class may be identified: consult CBNV’s 
business records and then follow a few steps to determine 
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whether the borrower is the real party in interest.  PNC has 
cited no authority holding that such an inquiry is onerous 
enough to defeat the ascertainability requirement.  And, even 
if the inquiry were difficult, PNC has adduced no evidence 
whatsoever suggesting that many – or even any – members of 
the class are actually embroiled in bankruptcy proceedings.  
Because PNC relies solely on speculation, it has not 
demonstrated that the District Court abused its discretion in 
ruling for the Plaintiffs on this issue.   
 
2. Commonality 
 
“A putative class satisfies Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement if the named plaintiffs share at least one question 
of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.”  
Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The bar is not high; 
we have acknowledged commonality to be present even when 
not all members of the plaintiff class suffered an actual injury, 
Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994); when 
class members did not have identical claims, In re Prudential 
Ins., 148 F.3d at 311; and, most dramatically, when some 
members’ claims were arguably not even viable, Sullivan v. 
DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 305-07 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
In reaching those conclusions, we explained that the focus of 
the commonality inquiry is not on the strength of each class 
member’s claims but instead “on whether the defendant’s 
conduct was common as to all of the class members.”  
Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 298; see also In re Warfarin Sodium 
Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004) (focusing 
the commonality inquiry on the defendant’s conduct, not “on 
the conduct of individual class members”); Newtown v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 
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183 (3d Cir. 2001) (identifying common questions regarding 
the defendant’s conduct); Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 57 
(considering only whether the defendant “engag[ed] in a 
common course of conduct toward” the class members).  In 
other words, as long as all putative class members were 
subjected to the same harmful conduct by the defendant, Rule 
23(a) will endure many legal and factual differences among 
the putative class members.  Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 56.   
 
That said, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
claims of each class member “must depend upon a common 
contention.”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.  “The ‘common 
contention … must be of such a nature that it is capable of 
classwide resolution – which means that determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.’”  Sullivan, 
667 F.3d at 335 (Scirica, J., concurring) (quoting Wal-Mart, 
131 S. Ct. at 2551).  Thus, “[w]hat matters to class 
certification … is not the raising of common questions – even 
in droves – but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding 
to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the 
litigation.”  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis and 
ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
We noted in Community Bank I, in dicta, our 
impression that the commonality requirement was satisfied in 
this case.  418 F.3d at 303 (“[T]he named plaintiffs share at 
least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the 
prospective class.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Relying on Community Bank I, the District Court concluded 
that the commonality requirement was satisfied because “the 
claims of all class members … depend on the existence of the 
Shumway scheme” and “[t]he viability of these claims is 
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ascertainable by examining identical loan documents.”  (App. 
at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  PNC asserts that 
the District Court erred in that conclusion in a number of 
ways.  First, it contends that each class member’s loan 
documents will “differ markedly on matters including interest 
rates, the existence/amount of discount fees, the title services 
provided, the amounts charged and prepayment features.”  
(Opening Br. at 34.)  Second, it asserts that, because fees 
charged to putative class members varied in type and amount, 
resolution of the disputed factual issues regarding those fees 
would require loan-by-loan analysis of each fee paid and each 
service performed.  PNC thus argues that class certification is 
foreclosed by Wal-Mart.     
 
We disagree.  In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court 
explained how the commonality standard applies when the 
complained-of conduct is a discretionary corporate policy that 
allegedly has a discriminatory effect.  The putative class in 
that case consisted of “all women employed at any Wal-Mart 
domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998, 
who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart’s challenged 
pay and management track promotions policies and 
practices.”  131 S. Ct. at 2549 (brackets and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Plaintiffs representing that enormous class of 
about 1.5 million women alleged that Wal-Mart’s policy of 
“allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment 
matters” produced a disparate discriminatory impact, 
evidenced by a statistical analysis of the company’s 
employment information.  Id. at 2547, 2554 (emphasis 
omitted).  The Supreme Court concluded that such evidence 
was insufficient to establish commonality.  While 
acknowledging that “giving discretion to lower-level 
supervisors can,” in some circumstances, “be the basis of 
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Title VII liability under a disparate-impact theory,” id. at 
2554, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart quoted Watson v. Fort 
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988), to emphasize 
that such claims must do more than “merely prov[e] that the 
discretionary system has produced a racial or sexual 
disparity” – they must also identify “the specific employment 
practice that is challenged,” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, Wal-Mart 
explained that, to bring a case as a class action, the named 
plaintiffs must show that each class member was subjected to 
the specifically challenged practice in roughly the same 
manner.  Id. at 2555-56.  The members of the putative class 
were all subjected to the discretion of their supervisors, but 
the plaintiffs had not demonstrated “a common mode of 
exercising discretion that pervades the entire company,” id. at 
2554-55, such that the policy could be considered a “uniform 
employment practice” that all members of the putative class 
had experienced, id. at 2554.  Rather, members of the 
proposed class encountered different managers making 
different types of employment decisions for different reasons, 
many of them potentially nondiscriminatory in nature.  The 
plaintiffs, therefore, had not demonstrated a common harm, 
and the proposed class lacked commonality.  Id. at 2555.   
 
The claims at issue here differ markedly from those in 
Wal-Mart.  Unlike the Wal-Mart plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs in 
this case have alleged that the class was subjected to the same 
kind of illegal conduct by the same entities, and that class 
members were harmed in the same way, albeit to potentially 
different extents.  Specifically, the Plaintiffs allege that 
CBNV operated a residential mortgage assembly line that 
included unlawful loans characterized by illegal kickbacks, 
materially inaccurate disclosures of the annual percentage 
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rates (“APR”) to be applied, and repeated mail and wire 
fraud.  As the Plaintiffs rightly point out, the following 
questions are common to each class member and will 
generate common answers:   
 
(1) Whether the structure created by CBNV 
and the loan production officers resulted 
in an unlawful kickback scheme that was 
a per se violation of RESPA.   
(2) Whether CBNV’s uniform method of 
excluding certain title charges from the 
APR calculation resulted in inaccurate 
TILA/HOEPA disclosures.   
(3) Whether CBNV’s acts tolled the claims 
of class members.   
(4) Whether the evidence presented proves a 
RICO conspiracy.   
While some individualized determinations may be 
necessary to completely resolve the claims of each putative 
class member in this case, those are not the focus of the 
commonality inquiry.  Instead, we must determine whether 
the Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that “the 
defendant’s conduct was common as to all of the class 
members.”  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 298.  In our judgment, they 
have.   
 
3. Predominance 
 
“Issues common to the class must predominate over 
individual issues.”  In re Prudential Ins., 148 F.3d at 313-14.  
This requirement under Rule 23(b) “tests whether proposed 
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classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by 
representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.  It is a “far more 
demanding” standard than the commonality requirement of 
Rule 23(a), id. at 623-24.  “Because the nature of the 
evidence that will suffice to resolve a question determines 
whether the question is common or individual, a district court 
must formulate some prediction as to how specific issues will 
play out in order to determine whether common or individual 
issues predominate in a given case.”  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “If proof of the essential elements of the 
cause of action requires individual treatment, then class 
certification is unsuitable.”  Newton, 259 F.3d at 172 
(emphasis added); see also Hayes, 725 F.3d at 359 (“[T]he 
predominance requirement focuses on whether essential 
elements of the class’s claims can be proven at trial with 
common, as opposed to individualized, evidence.”).  
Accordingly, we must examine the elements of the Plaintiffs’ 
claims “through the prism” of Rule 23 to determine whether 
the District Court properly certified the class.  Newton, 259 
F.3d at 181.   
 
Quoting our dicta in Community Bank I, the District 
Court noted that “‘[a]ll plaintiffs’ claims arise from the same 
alleged fraudulent scheme.’”  (App. at 19 (quoting 
Community Bank I, 418 F.3d at 309).)  The Court also 
repeated our statement that “the record … supports a finding 
of … predominance.”  (App. at 19; see also Community Bank 
II, 622 F.3d at 284.)   
 
PNC argues that the predominance requirement is not 
satisfied for a number of reasons: first, because a 
determination of putative class members’ standing based on 
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prior bankruptcies is highly individualized, it defeats the 
predominance requirement; second, equitable tolling is 
required for many of the putative class members’ RESPA and 
TILA/HOEPA claims to remain viable, and equitable tolling 
is a highly individualized inquiry; third, various elements of 
the Plaintiffs’ RESPA claims require individual analysis; 
fourth, the Plaintiffs’ TILA/HOEPA claims present 
substantial individualized issues; and fifth, the Plaintiffs’ 
RICO claims contain individual issues that would 
predominate.  None of those arguments succeeds.   
 
a. Standing 
 
PNC asserts that, “[b]ecause a determination of 
putative class members’ standing (or lack thereof) based on 
prior bankruptcies is highly individualized, it defeats the 
predominance requirement as well.”  (Opening Br. at 37.)  
PNC offers no additional argument or elaboration on this 
assertion.  For the reasons discussed above regarding 
ascertainability and standing, the argument is unpersuasive 
and requires no further consideration.  See supra pp. 31-34.   
 
b. Equitable Tolling 
 
According to PNC, equitable tolling is a “highly 
individualized” inquiry that is not susceptible to common 
proof, and inquiries about equitable tolling will predominate 
in the litigation.  (Opening Br. at 37-38.)   
 
Equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to sue after the 
statutory time period for filing a complaint has expired “(1) 
[if] the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting 
the plaintiff’s cause of action, (2) [if] the plaintiff in some 
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extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or 
her rights, or (3) [if] the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her 
rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.”  Oshiver v. Levin, 
Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 
1994); see also Miller v. N.J. State Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 
616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable tolling is an 
appropriate remedy when principles of equity would make a 
rigid application of the statute of limitations unfair).   
 
The Plaintiffs invoke equitable tolling based on what 
they allege is fraudulent concealment, and they thereby seek 
to preserve the timeliness of certain putative class members’ 
RESPA and TILA/HOEPA claims.20  The fraudulent 
                                              
20 PNC does not dispute that the doctrine of equitable 
tolling is available to toll the relevant statutes of limitations.  
We have concluded that TILA’s statute of limitations “is not 
jurisdictional and is therefore subject to equitable tolling.”  
Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 156 F.3d 499, 505 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  We based our conclusion on the statute’s text, 
structure, and policy.  Id. at 502-04.  For purposes of 
determining whether the two statutes are jurisdictional, the 
text and structure of the limitations statute in TILA and 
RESPA are substantively similar.  Compare 12 U.S.C. § 2614 
(RESPA), with 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (TILA).  The two 
schemes also share similar purposes.  Compare 12 U.S.C. 
§ 2601(b) (“It is the purpose of this chapter to effect certain 
changes in the settlement process for residential real estate 
that will result– (1) in more effective advance disclosure to 
home buyers and sellers of settlement costs; (2) in the 
elimination of kickbacks or referral fees that tend to increase 
unnecessarily the costs of certain settlement services … .”), 
with 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter 
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concealment doctrine operates to stop the statute of 
limitations from running in circumstances when the accrual 
date of a claim has passed but the “plaintiff’s cause of action 
has been obscured by the defendant’s conduct.”  In re 
Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 160 (3d Cir. 2002).  
The plaintiff has the burden of proving fraudulent 
concealment, which requires a three-part showing: “(1) that 
the defendant actively misled the plaintiff; (2) which 
prevented the plaintiff from recognizing the validity of her 
claim within the limitations period; and (3) where the 
plaintiff’s ignorance is not attributable to her lack of 
reasonable due diligence in attempting to uncover the relevant 
facts.”  Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Grp., 460 F.3d 494, 509 (3d Cir. 
2006).   
 
PNC argues that the “actively misled” and “reasonable 
due diligence” components will require individualized fact 
finding, which undermines any claim of predominance.   
                                                                                                     
to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various 
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of 
credit … .”).  We therefore conclude that, like TILA, the 
statute of limitations in RESPA is not jurisdictional and is 
thus subject to equitable tolling.  See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. 
v. Dearborn Title Corp., 118 F.3d 1157, 1166-67 (7th Cir. 
1997) (holding that RESPA’s statute of limitations is subject 
to equitable tolling).  But see Hardin v. City Title & Escrow 
Co., 797 F.2d 1037, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (concluding that 
the limitation in RESPA is jurisdictional). 
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i. Active Misleading 
 
As PNC points out, “a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate 
fraudulent concealment of a claim must prove that the 
defendant took affirmative steps to mislead the plaintiff with 
respect to the claim.”  (Opening Br. at 41.)  See Oshiver, 38 
F.3d at 1391 n.10 (refusing to apply equitable tolling to the 
plaintiff’s failure-to-hire claim because the plaintiff did not 
allege that the defendant affirmatively misled her).  PNC also 
notes that proof of active misleading generally requires a 
plaintiff to demonstrate “‘efforts by the defendant – above 
and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plaintiff’s claim 
is founded – to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time.’”  
(Opening Br. at 41-42 (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare 
Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990)).)  PNC contends 
that, as a result, “‘[f]or a RESPA claim to warrant equitable 
tolling, mere silence or nondisclosure is not enough to trigger 
estoppel[;] the adversary must commit some affirmative 
independent act of concealment upon which the plaintiffs 
justifiably rely in order to toll the statute.’”  (Opening Br. at 
42 (brackets in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Garczynski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 
2d 505, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2009)).)  Similarly, PNC asserts that, in 
the TILA context, “‘[t]he fraudulent act that forms the basis 
of a claim for damages under the TILA will not satisfy the 
factual showing required to invoke the equitable tolling 
doctrine of fraudulent concealment.’”  (Opening Br. at 42 
(brackets in original) (quoting Poskin v. TD Banknorth, N.A., 
687 F. Supp. 2d 530, 551 (W.D. Pa. 2009)).)  Thus, PNC 
argues, because each putative class member must demonstrate 
an independent misrepresentation (in addition to the allegedly 
misleading loan closing documents) that he or she relied 
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upon, more individualized inquiry is necessary to resolve the 
equitable tolling issue embedded in the Plaintiffs’ RESPA 
and TILA/HOEPA claims than is permitted under the 
predominance requirement.     
 
The Plaintiffs counter that no independent act of 
concealment is necessary where the wrong is “self-
concealing.”  (Answering Br. at 33.)  See Osterneck v. E.T. 
Barwick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1535 n.28 (11th Cir. 
1987) (stating that where concealment is inherent in the 
nature of the wrong, all that is necessary to toll the statute of 
limitations is a plaintiff’s due diligence in seeking to discover 
the fraud).  They also contend that “[n]owhere in any of the 
seminal Third Circuit equitable tolling decisions is there any 
mandate that some further act of concealment is necessary to 
invoke the doctrine where the wrong is self-concealing.”  
(Answering Br. at 34 n.16 (citing Oshiver, 38 F.3d 1380; 
Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 156 F.3d 499 (3d Cir. 
2006); Cetel, 460 F.3d 494).   
 
Because the Plaintiffs have advanced a sufficiently 
credible argument that PNC’s predecessor in interest, CBNV, 
did commit an affirmative act of concealment, we do not need 
to decide whether mere silence is enough to allow the case to 
proceed.   
 
The Plaintiffs are able to claim an independent act of 
concealment with respect to each loan because CBNV 
allegedly misrepresented material facts in the HUD–1 
settlement statements used in closing the loans of every class 
member, and those misrepresentations arguably support 
application of equitable tolling.  More specifically, the 
additional act of concealment perpetrated by CBNV was, 
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according to the Plaintiffs, providing a HUD–1 that contained 
false representations as to the destination of the settlement 
fees (for the RESPA claims) and a false representation that a 
title company performed a bona fide title search and title 
examination (for the TILA/HOEPA claims).  See Reiser v. 
Residential Funding Corp., 420 F. Supp. 2d 940, 947 (S.D. 
Ill. 2004) (holding that plaintiffs adequately pled equitable 
tolling as to their RESPA and TILA claims by alleging that 
defendants had misrepresented and concealed facts relating to 
fees represented on the HUD–1 statements), rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 380 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2004).   
 
PNC, of course, disagrees that transmission of a HUD–
1 to a class member can constitute an “independent act” of 
concealment sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable 
tolling as to the RESPA or TILA/HOEPA claims.  Its 
argument is primarily based on Moll v. U.S. Life Title 
Insurance Company of New York, 700 F. Supp. 1284 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), which rejected the argument that we now 
accept – that transmission of a misleading HUD–1 constitutes 
an independent act of concealment.  The Moll plaintiffs 
argued that the HUD–1s “falsely stated that US Life would 
receive the full premium charged for the title insurance,” 
when in fact portions of that premium were allegedly “kicked 
back” to another entity.  Id. at 1292-93.  But Moll reasoned 
that the HUD–1s made no representation as to “the ultimate 
disposition of those charges,” and particularly, that the HUD–
1s did not represent that the defendant “was ‘accepting’ (i.e., 
retaining for its own account) the premium charged.”  Id. at 
1291-92 (additional internal quotation marks omitted).  
Instead, Moll concluded that the HUD–1s simply reported the 
charges actually assessed to and paid by the plaintiffs, and the 
forms did so without warranting anything about the validity 
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or ultimate disposition of the disputed charges.  Because the 
amounts listed were accurate – that is, they were the amounts 
that plaintiffs had actually paid – Moll concluded that 
transmission of a HUD–1 did not constitute an independent 
act of concealment because it did not contain any false 
information.  Id. at 1292-93.   
 
There is, however, a gap in that logic.  Even assuming 
that a HUD–1 correctly summarizes the fees and charges 
actually paid by a borrower for settlement services in 
connection with a federally related mortgage loan, it does not 
follow that the HUD–1 should be viewed in isolation.  
Federal regulations associated with that form control the 
nature and quality of information that is supposed to be 
included in each HUD–1, and borrowers should be able to 
rely on that information in fact being of the requisite nature 
and quality.  Of particular relevance here, 24 C.F.R. § 3500.8 
provides the following: 
 
The settlement agent shall state the actual 
charges paid by the borrower and seller on the 
HUD–1, or by the borrower on the HUD–1A.  
The settlement agent must separately itemize 
each third party charge paid by the borrower 
and seller.  All origination services performed 
by or on behalf of the loan originator must be 
included in the loan originator’s own charge.  
Administrative and processing services related 
to title services must be included in the title 
underwriter’s or title agent’s own charge.  The 
amount stated on the HUD–1 or HUD–1A for 
any itemized service cannot exceed the amount 
actually received by the settlement service 
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provider for that itemized service, unless the 
charge is an average charge in accordance with 
paragraph (b)(2) of this section.21   
HUD–1s that deviate from the requirements of section 3500.8 
thus can be materially misleading because transmission of a 
HUD–1 impliedly warrants compliance with that section’s 
specific requirements.  We therefore conclude that inclusion 
of misleading information in a HUD–1 can constitute an 
independent act of concealment.  Cf. White v. PNC Fin. Servs. 
Grp., No. 11-7928, 2014 WL 4063344, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. 
Aug. 18, 2014); Barlee v. First Horizon Nat’l Corp., No. 12-
3045, 2013 WL 706091, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2013).  
Under the facts of this case, a common question as to active 
misleading predominates over any individualized issues.   
 
ii. Reasonable Due Diligence 
 
To qualify for equitable tolling, however, the Plaintiffs 
must show not only an act of concealment, but reasonable 
diligence on their own part as well.  “To demonstrate 
                                              
21 This version of section 3500.8 was promulgated in 
November 2008.  See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(RESPA): Rule To Simplify and Improve the Process of 
Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce Consumer Settlement 
Costs, 73 Fed. Reg. 68204, 68241 (November 17, 2008).  But 
it was removed in June 2014, see Removal of Regulations 
Transferred to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 79 
Fed. Reg. 34224, 34225 (June 16, 2014).  It now appears at 
12 C.F.R. § 1024.8(b)(1).  Relevant for our purposes, a prior 
version of section 3500.8 that was in effect in 1998 imposed 
substantially identical reporting requirements for HUD–1s.   
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reasonable diligence, a plaintiff must establish that he pursued 
the cause of his injury with those qualities of attention, 
knowledge, intelligence and judgment which society requires 
of its members for the protection of their own interests and 
the interests of others.”  Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 F.3d 502, 
511 (3d Cir. 2006) (brackets and internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
Relying on Riddle v. Bank of America Corp., No. 12-
1740, 2013 WL 6061363 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 2013) aff’d, 588 
F. App’x 127 (3d Cir. 2014), PNC argues that the reasonable 
diligence component of the equitable tolling inquiry is not 
susceptible to common proof but, instead, that each class 
member will need to be queried about his individual 
knowledge and attempts to discover his claims before the 
limitations period expired.  Addressing the merits of equitable 
tolling and not the issue of certification in the putative class 
action, Riddle analyzed in detail evidence regarding each 
named plaintiff’s diligence before concluding that plaintiffs 
could not pursue equitable tolling of the limitations period on 
their RESPA claim.  Id. at *2-4, *5-7.  We do not dispute that 
reasonable diligence is generally a fact-specific inquiry.  But 
when a wrongful scheme is perpetrated through the use of 
common documentation, such as the documents employed to 
memorialize each putative class member’s mortgage loan, full 
participation in the loan process is alone sufficient to establish 
the due diligence element.  Cf. Cunningham v. M & T Bank 
Corp., No. 1:12-cv-1238, 2013 WL 5876337, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 
Oct. 30, 2013) (finding that allegations that the putative class 
fully participated in all aspects of the mortgage loan 
transactions and reviewed all relevant documents, but were 
nonetheless unable to discover the RESPA violation, were 
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sufficient to satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement for 
equitable tolling at the pleading stage).   
 
The rationale for holding that participation in the 
mortgage loan process can establish the “due diligence” 
element of equitable tolling was explained in Bradford v. WR 
Starkey Mortgage, LLP, No. 2:06-CV-86, 2008 WL 4501957 
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 2008), in which the court stated, “Plaintiff 
had no reason to suspect that defendant, or any other lender, 
might be improperly marking-up settlement charges, and the 
due diligence requirement does not demand that plaintiff 
inquire about the various fees at issue.”  Id. at *3.  Bradford 
specifically rejected the same argument made here by PNC, 
saying that, “[h]aving flouted the regulation, defendant cannot 
now try to penalize plaintiff for trusting the validity of the 
settlement costs delineated on his HUD–1 Statement.”  Id. at 
*3 n.6.   
 
We agree with that conclusion.  Due diligence does not 
mean that borrowers must presume their bank is lying or 
dissembling and therefore that further investigation is needed.  
Reading the blizzard of paper that sweeps before them is 
ample diligence in itself.  In short, a borrower ought to be 
able to rely on the documents provided by a financial 
institution.  Indeed, RESPA and TILA/HOEPA were passed, 
in large part, because Congress recognized that the average 
borrower is incapable of detecting many unfair lending 
practices, including fraud.  “[W]hile the law of fraud does not 
endorse a ‘hear no evil, see no evil approach,’ neither does it 
require that an aggrieved party have proceeded from the 
outset as though he were dealing with thieves.”  Jones v. 
Childers, 18 F.3d 899, 907 (11th Cir. 1994) (additional 
quotation marks omitted).  “A plaintiff … cannot be expected 
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to exercise diligence unless there is some reason to awaken 
inquiry and direct diligence in the channel in which it would 
be successful.  This is what is meant by reasonable 
diligence.”  Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Grp., Inc., 
949 F.2d 1274, 1282 (3d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   The Complaint here does not allege any facts 
disclosed on the face of the HUD–1s or that were otherwise 
provided to the Plaintiffs that should have awakened inquiry 
and demanded some further diligence.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the Plaintiffs’ allegation that the class fully 
participated in all aspects of the mortgage loan transactions 
by “reviewing their loan documentation” is sufficient to 
satisfy the reasonable diligence requirement for equitable 
tolling in this case.  (App. at 307, ¶ 409.)  Cf. White, 2014 
WL 4063344, at *5-6.  In addition, proving that class 
members did, in fact, fully participate in the loan process in 
that fashion does not cause the issue of equitable tolling to 
predominate over issues common to the whole class.   
 
We do not address whether the class members are 
actually entitled to equitable tolling on the merits.  Equitable 
tolling “is extended only sparingly” and under “sufficiently 
inequitable circumstances.”  Glover v. FDIC, 698 F.3d 139, 
151 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
Plaintiffs may ultimately be unable to demonstrate that they 
are factually entitled to its benefits.  We only conclude here 
that the common issues of fact and law predominate over 
individual ones such that the issue is suitable for class-wide 
treatment on the merits.   
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c. RESPA Claims 
 
PNC advances several arguments for why the 
Plaintiffs’ RESPA claims – quite apart from equitable tolling 
concerns – present individualized issues that would 
predominate in this litigation and should therefore prevent 
class certification.22  First, it asserts that, to litigate the 
RESPA claims, the putative class will be required to 
demonstrate on a loan-by-loan basis that no services were 
provided in exchange for the alleged kickbacks.  But the 
Complaint alleges that Equity Plus performed absolutely no 
services to earn the transferred (i.e., kicked-back) portion of 
the fees, which is at least plausible in light of the contractual 
arrangement between Equity Plus and CBNV.23  While that 
                                              
22 PNC urges us to acknowledge, as other circuits 
have, that RESPA section 8 kickback cases are generally not 
a good fit for class certification.  See, e.g., Howland v. First 
Am. Title Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 525, 526, 530 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(“Class actions are rare in RESPA Section 8 cases” because 
“at the class certification stage … the existence or the amount 
of the kickback … generally requires an individual analysis of 
each alleged kickback to compare the services performed 
with the payment made.”).  There is no need for us to 
consider that broad statement, though, because a narrower 
holding is appropriate here.   
23 According to the Plaintiffs, whether or not services 
were provided in exchange for kickbacks will not be in 
dispute at trial because Equity Plus was contractually barred 
from performing mortgage broker services under a consulting 
agreement between CBNV and Equity Plus.  PNC responds 
that the agreement merely states that Equity Plus “will not act 
as a mortgage broker,” but it does not state that Equity Plus 
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allegation places a potentially onerous evidentiary burden on 
the Plaintiffs, it also leads us to conclude that, on the present 
record and at this stage of the case, PNC’s arguments fail to 
show that the District Court abused its discretion.   
 
Second, PNC asserts that “there are several different 
types of [fees] that Plaintiffs are complaining about, and not 
all putative class members paid every such fee.”  (Opening 
Br. at 48.)  PNC contends that, as a result, the fact-finder will 
be required to determine what fees were assessed to each 
individual class member and whether Equity Plus performed 
services in exchange for each fee, and that such individual 
determinations would predominate in the litigation.  That 
argument is also unpersuasive because, again, Equity Plus – 
the recipient of the settlement fees at issue in this case – 
allegedly performed no mortgage broker services in exchange 
for the fees and was contractually precluded from providing 
any services.   
 
PNC’s third and fourth arguments can be addressed 
simultaneously.  The third argument is that any claims 
premised on alleged violations of the affiliated business 
arrangement (“ABA”) disclosure requirements of RESPA 
would require loan-by-loan analysis of the ABA 
                                                                                                     
will not perform other types of services in exchange for the 
fees at issue.  (Opening Br. at 47 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).)  In fact, PNC argues, portions of the agreement 
suggest that Equity Plus is actually required to perform 
services at CBNV’s request, and PNC claims that it did 
perform a variety of services pursuant to its obligations under 
that agreement.     
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disclosures.24  The fourth argument is that any claims 
premised on CBNV’s alleged practice of charging “discount 
fees” without providing a discount interest rate in exchange 
would require an examination of each individual loan to see 
whether the borrower was charged a discount fee, and if so, 
whether the borrower obtained a discount or some other 
benefit as consideration for the fee.  We need not address the 
merits of either of those arguments, however, because the 
alleged violations of the ABA disclosure requirements and 
the alleged discount fee practice are not essential to the 
Plaintiffs’ RESPA claims.  The elements of the Plaintiffs’ 
RESPA claims that are “essential” – namely violations of the 
anti-kickback and unearned fee provisions of RESPA – can 
potentially be proven with common evidence.  Hayes, 725 
F.3d at 359 (“[T]he predominance requirement focuses on 
whether essential elements of the class’s claims can be proven 
at trial with common, as opposed to individualized, 
evidence.”).   
 
                                              
24 RESPA has provisions and regulations relating to 
business arrangements between real estate brokerage firms 
and affiliated settlement service provides.  A referrer may 
only refer to affiliates if the following three requirements are 
met: (1) disclosure is given to the consumer at or before the 
time each referral is made, in the form prescribed by 
regulation; (2) the consumer is not required to use any 
particular provider of settlement services; and (3) the only 
thing of value that is received from the arrangement, other 
than reasonable payments for good, facilities, or services 
furnished, is a return on the ownership interest the affiliates 
may have in one another.  12 C.F.R. § 1024.15(b) (earlier 
codified at 24 C.F.R. § 3500.15(b)).   
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Finally, PNC argues that a damages issue precludes 
class certification.  While RESPA permits recovery “in an 
amount equal to three times the amount of any charge paid,” 
12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2) (emphasis added), PNC contends that 
many class members did not pay the fees directly, receiving 
reduced loan distributions instead.  As a result, says PNC, in 
addition to individualized determinations at the liability stage, 
each class member will be required at the damages stage of 
the case to demonstrate that he actually paid the fees instead 
of receiving reduced distributions.  But PNC gives no reason 
why the distinction between an indirect payment of fees (i.e., 
by subtracting the fee from the loan distribution) and a direct 
payment has any legal or practical significance, and none 
occurs to us.   
 
In sum, none of these issues defeats the Plaintiffs’ 
showing of predominance as to the RESPA claims.   
 
d. TILA/HOEPA Claims 
 
PNC advances three arguments for why the Plaintiffs’ 
TILA/HOEPA claims present individualized issues that 
would predominate at trial and thereby prevent class 
certification.  First, it asserts that those claims will require the 
class to show that its members paid fees that were not “‘bona 
fide and reasonable in amount.’”  (Opening Br. at 51 (quoting 
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7)).)  That showing, PNC contends, 
would require loan-by-loan and fee-by-fee analysis in the 
context of every real estate market in which each transaction 
occurred.  The Plaintiffs assert that CBNV improperly 
excluded certain charges from its APR calculation – improper 
charges that were added to every loan – that resulted in a 
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materially misstated APR.25  Contrary to what PNC argues, 
whether the fees were in fact excluded from the APR 
calculation requires simple arithmetic.  Community Bank I, 
418 F.3d at 306 (“Whether an individual borrower has a 
viable TILA or HOEPA claim may be determinable by 
conducting simple arithmetic computations on certain figures 
obtained from the face of each loan’s TILA Disclosure 
Statement.”).  And the Plaintiffs contend that whether the fees 
were bona fide can be resolved by classwide evidence: first, 
whether CBNV performed independent title abstract or title 
searches or whether it merely paid a third party entity to 
perform a perfunctory current-owner search that generated a 
“property report,” which is not the same thing as performing a 
                                              
25 The Plaintiffs explain the method employed to 
calculate the APR as follows (the references to line numbers 
being to the lines on the HUD-1 forms):   
The APR is calculated through a mathematical 
formula derived from the Amount Financed 
([i.e.,] funds actually available to the borrower) 
and [the] Finance Charge ([i.e.,] the costs 
incidental to the extension of credit).  These two 
numbers are mutually exclusive; a settlement 
charge is allocated to either one or the other, but 
not to both.  Title related charges like the line 
1102 fee, a title search or title abstract fee, or 
the line 1103 a title examination fee may be 
excluded from the calculation of the Finance 
Charge (resulting in a lower APR), but only if 
those fees are “bona fide and reasonable in 
amount.”  12 CFR § 226.4(c)(7).   
(Answering Br. at 46.) 
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bona fide title search; and second, whether CBNV performed 
a bona fide title examination or whether it paid a title 
examination company to review the “property report,” which 
does not constitute a true title examination.  The District 
Court evidently accepted those arguments, and, at this stage 
and on this record, we see no abuse of discretion in that 
decision.   
 
Second, PNC contends that the Plaintiffs’ 
TILA/HOEPA claims premised on deficient HOEPA 
disclosures will require loan-by-loan analysis because the 
loan documents were not uniform from putative class member 
to putative class member.  But, even assuming that PNC is 
correct, those possible issues do not affect the principal 
violations of TILA/HOEPA alleged in the Complaint and so 
do not undermine the District Court’s decision on 
predominance.   
 
Third, PNC contends that the Plaintiffs’ TILA/HOEPA 
claims premised on CBNV’s failure to provide HOEPA 
notices to borrowers three days before closing will also 
require significant individual inquiry because numerous 
CBNV files contain the borrower’s signed acknowledgment 
of timely receipt of the HOEPA notice or an overnight mail 
receipt demonstrating timely delivery, all of which 
demonstrates that there was no uniform policy to not provide 
notices.  The Plaintiffs respond that, while their Complaint 
alleges that CBNV failed to provide timely HOEPA 
disclosures and that such a failure is grounds for relief under 
TILA/HOEPA, PNC’s argument is beside the point of their 
claim.  The Plaintiffs say that the primary means by which 
CBNV violated the advance notice provisions was by 
including inaccurate – not untimely – information in the 
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HOEPA disclosure, and that the inaccuracy of CBNV’s 
HOEPA disclosures can be proven with classwide evidence.  
Therefore, the Plaintiffs argue, PNC’s contention that each 
class member must testify as to whether he received his 
HOEPA disclosure in a timely manner misses the mark 
because the timeliness of the disclosure is not the alleged 
basis of liability.     
 
While the Plaintiffs’ argument downplays the actual 
language of their pleading – language that does assert the 
timeliness of the HOEPA disclosures as a basis of liability, 
completely separate from the accuracy of the disclosures – 
PNC has failed to demonstrate that the District Court erred in 
determining that the timeliness issue does not create 
evidentiary problems that will predominate in the litigation.  
The timeliness issue might be systematically resolved as to 
each class member by either consulting CBNV’s files, which 
contain signed acknowledgements of delivery and mail 
receipts, or by inspecting mail carriers’ documentation.  More 
importantly, though, even if individualized inquiries 
predominate this particular TILA/HOEPA basis for liability 
and thus suggest that it not be handled as a class claim, that 
does not undermine the predominance of the primary claims 
of liability for TILA/HOEPA violations, namely, the delivery 
of inaccurate information.   
 
e. RICO Claims   
 
PNC also advances three arguments for why the 
Plaintiffs’ RICO claims present individualized issues that 
would predominate and should therefore prevent class 
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certification.26  First, PNC asserts that there is no support for 
the Plaintiffs’ contention that reliance may be presumed for 
purposes of their RICO claim and thus it will be necessary for 
each class member to prove individual reliance.  The 
Plaintiffs respond that they can prove their RICO claims with 
the same classwide evidence that will be used to prove the 
RESPA and TILA/HOEPA claims.  And, they say, “where 
proof of the RICO violation is demonstrated through common 
evidence of a common scheme, reliance may be inferred on a 
classwide basis.”  (Answering Br. at 52.)  Again, on this 
record and in this context, we do not believe that the District 
Court abused its discretion in accepting the Plaintiffs’ 
position.   
 
                                              
26 To plead a violation of section 1962(c), plaintiffs 
must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a 
pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”  In re Ins. Brokerage 
Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Racketeering activity” is defined 
to include a list of state and federal offenses, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961(1), two of which are the federal mail fraud and wire 
fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 & 1343.  Here, Plaintiffs 
allege that the predicate acts are the defendants’ actions that 
underlie the RESPA and TILA/HOEPA violations.  “While 
the Supreme Court has clarified that first-party reliance is not 
an element of a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud, it may 
be … a necessary part of the causation theory advanced by 
the plaintiffs.”  In re U.S. Foodservice Inc. Pricing Litig., 729 
F.3d 108, 119 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 
U.S. 639, 649 (2008)).   
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Second, PNC asserts that the question of whether each 
settlement fee at issue was somehow improper will require a 
loan-by-loan and fee-by-fee analysis and, therefore, that 
individualized fact inquiries at the damages stage of each 
RICO claim preclude class certification.  That argument, 
though, is mistaken.  The Plaintiffs do not allege that Equity 
Plus performed inadequate services in exchange for fees.  
Their argument, again, is that class-wide evidence 
demonstrates that Equity Plus performed no services in 
exchange for settlement charges.   
 
Third, PNC argues that the Plaintiffs cannot “set forth 
… [classwide] proof [of] actual monetary loss,” as is required 
to sustain a RICO claim.  (Opening Br. at 59 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  Individual issues will 
predominate, says PNC, because the Plaintiffs will need to 
demonstrate the difference between the fees that they paid 
and the fees that they should have paid.  Once more, for the 
reasons set forth above, that argument fails – the Plaintiffs do 
not assert that Equity Plus rendered inadequate services for 
which class members are entitled to claw back part of the fee.  
They assert that Equity Plus performed no services and was 
entitled to no fee at all.  For that reason, it was not an abuse of 
discretion for the District Court to conclude in effect that 
individualized inquiry will not be necessary.   
 
4. Superiority 
 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that class treatment be “superior 
to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy,” and it provides a non-
exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining 
superiority, including: the class members’ interest in 
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individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions; 
the extent and nature of any similar litigation already 
commenced by class members; the desirability of 
concentrating the litigation in a particular forum; and the 
difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a 
class action.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  “The superiority 
requirement asks a district court to balance, in terms of 
fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against 
those of alternative available methods of adjudication.”  
Community Bank I, 418 F.3d at 309 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
The District Court relied on our statement in 
Community Bank I that there is “no reason … why a Rule 
23(b)(3) class action is not the superior means to adjudicate 
this matter.”  Id.  The District Court also observed that “class 
members would face some difficult, if not insurmountable, 
tolling issues if they were required to file suit on their own 
behalf at this time.”  (App. at 19.)   
 
PNC’s response is that the District Court erred on the 
superiority issue in that “[t]olling of individual suits based on 
previously-filed class action litigation … is a non-issue 
because of the class action tolling rule”27 and that “[a]n 
individual plaintiff would be in the same position, vis-à-vis 
                                              
27 Under the class action tolling rule, the filing of a 
class action lawsuit in federal court tolls the statute of 
limitation for the claims of unnamed class members until 
class certification is denied or when the member ceases to be 
part of the class, at which point the class member may 
intervene or file an individual suit.  Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. 
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551-53 (1974).   
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the statute of limitations, as he or she would be as a class 
member.”  (Opening Br. at 61.)  PNC also asserts that, 
because putative class members’ HOEPA claims average well 
over $28,000 and because they are pursuing statutory claims 
that permit recovery of their attorneys’ fees, this case 
involves the sorts of claims that individuals would have an 
incentive to pursue on their own.   
 
Those assertions, however, fail to account for the 
“difficult, if not insurmountable” issues noted by the District 
Court that class members would need to overcome in filing 
individual lawsuits “almost a decade after [class members] 
first received notice that this case had been prosecuted and 
settled for them.”  (App. at 19).  In addition, PNC does not 
consider the tremendous burden that presiding over tens of 
thousands of nearly identical cases alleging RESPA, TILA, 
HOEPA, and RICO claims would impose on the courts.  The 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 
superiority requirement is satisfied in this case.   
 
5. Manageability 
 
Finally, PNC argues that the District Court erred on 
manageability.  It first says that “the same factors that defeat 
commonality and predominance … also make this case 
unmanageable as a class action.”  (Opening Br. at 62.)  
Because we have concluded that the District Court cannot be 
faulted for deciding that the commonality and predominance 
requirements for class certification have been satisfied, this 
tag-along argument fails.   
 
PNC further contends that the District Court’s 
acknowledgement that damages issues would require 
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individualized inquiry – while dismissing as “premature” and 
“speculative” any consideration of solutions to address that 
difficulty – “is tantamount to an affirmative finding that the 
manageability requirement is not satisfied.”  (Id.)  That 
manageability argument fares no better than the first.  As the 
District Court noted, “Rule 23(d) vests in the Court 
substantial discretion to enter orders, subsequent to the Order 
Certifying the Class that will follow, to manage the class.”  
(App. at 19.)  Moreover, there are “‘imaginative solutions to 
problems created by the presence in a class action litigation of 
individual damages.’”  (Id. at 19-20 (quoting Carnegie v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).)  By 
refusing to settle on any particular solution at the same time 
that it certified the class, the District Court was not ruling that 
the litigation was unmanageable.  That a class action may 
require some inquiry into facts specific to individual class 
members, such as damages, is not a novel observation, nor 
does it necessarily mean that a class action will be 
unmanageable.  The District Court did not err by deciding 
that it could address this aspect of case management more 
fully at a later date.   
 
III. Conclusion 
 
Thus ends the third and, one hopes, the last 
quinquennial presentation of class certification questions to 
this court in this case.  PNC has failed to demonstrate that the 
District Court abused its discretion as to any certification 
issue or requirement, and we will therefore affirm.   
